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INTRODUCTION
In July 2012, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws1 approved and recommended that states adopt
the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (the Act).2
Unlike its predecessor,3 the 1983 Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act,4 the Act regulates “premarital agreements and marital
agreements under the same set of principles and requirements.”5
* Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby College; J.D., The
University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Robin Babcox-Poole, Amanda Beveroth, Jenna Ewing,
and David Smith for their superb assistance. All errors are mine.
1. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT 9C U.L.A. III (Supp. 2014). The
Conference is also known as the Uniform Law Commission. Id.
2. Id.
3. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT 9C U.L.A. 39 (1983); UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL
AGREEMENTS ACT 9C U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2014) (stating that in 2012, the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act had been adopted in some form by twenty-six jurisdictions).
4. The history in the United States regarding premarital pacts before the Act is summarized in J.
Thomas Oldham, Would Enactment of the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement Act in All Fifty
States Change U.S. Law Regarding Premarital Agreements?, 46 FAM. L.Q. 367, 368–71 (2012), and it
is more extensively reviewed in J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or
Maybe Not: A Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After Three Decades, 19 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 83 (2011).
5. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT 9C U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2014). Not all
prenups and midnups are treated comparably today. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Traster, 291 P.3d 494,
504 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (“[W]e recognize the postmarital agreement as a legitimate marital contract in
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While both Uniform Acts speak largely to agreements about
property, including money,6 only the Act expressly recognizes there
may be agreements on “custodial responsibility.”7
Under the Act,8 custodial agreements do not “bind” the courts
because “parents and prospective parents do not have the power to
its own right that does not come within the statutory purview of either a premarital or a separation
agreement.”). Similar treatment would not mean that any matter subject to a premarital pact might also
be subject to a midmarital pact. See, e.g., Hussemann ex rel. Ritter v. Hussemann, 847 N.W.2d 219
(Iowa 2014) (finding that postmarital pact waiving a spouse’s elective share in a decedent’s asset
distribution is against public policy).
6. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 2, 9C U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 2014) (stating
that agreements regarding “a marital right or obligation” include spousal support, a property right, a
responsibility for a liability, and an attorney’s fee award).
7. Id. at § 10(a). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-310(3) (2013) (stating that a term that defines “the
rights or duties of the parties regarding custodial responsibility” is unenforceable). Before the Act, some
state premarital agreement statutes recognized more obliquely the possibility of “custodial
responsibility” pacts. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-203(A)(8) (2007); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
10/4(a)(8) (1999) (“Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to . . . any other matter,
including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a
criminal penalty.”). The foregoing was seemingly taken from the UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT
§ 3, 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983). Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 557.28 (2006) (“A contract relating to
property made between persons in contemplation of marriage shall remain in full force after marriage
takes place.”), and W. VA. CODE § 48-1-203 (2001) (stating that antenuptial or prenuptial agreement
“means an agreement . . . by which the property rights and interests of the prospective husband and wife,
or both of them, are determined . . . .”), with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2-a (2004) (“A man and
woman in contemplation of marriage may enter into a written interspousal contract . . . . However, no
contract otherwise enforceable . . . may contain any term which attempts to abrogate the statutory or
common law rights of minor children of the contemplated marriage.”), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-35
(West 2014) (“A premarital or pre-civil union agreement shall not adversely affect the right of a child to
support.”), and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-4(A)(7) (2013) (stating that premarital agreement may
contain “any other matter not in violation of public policy.”).
In addition, the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution recognizes
that agreements made during or in contemplation of marriage regarding parenting plans “may
sometimes be relevant to an allocation of custodial and decision making responsibility.” PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06, at cmt. a (2002)
[hereinafter ALI Principles] (citing PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.08(1)(8)(e)
(allocations of custodial responsibility between parents can be founded, in part, on prior agreements to
meet “the reasonable expectations of the parties”) and § 2.09(1)(e) (stating allocations of significant
decision making responsibility between parents should be made “in accordance with the child’s best
interests, in light of” several factors including a prior agreement)). While the ALI Principles speak to
marriage and nonmarriage related pacts, this paper speaks only to marriage related pacts on parentage.
Often nonmarriage related pacts on parentage are undertaken when marriage is impossible, as is the case
in some jurisdictions with same sex couples. See, e.g., Latham v. Schwerdtfeger, 802 N.W.2d 66 (Neb.
2011) (holding an agreement enforceable where a same-sex couple agreed that one partner would have a
child that both partners would raise).
8. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 10, 9C U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 2014). In
Colorado and North Dakota, statutes expressly note the nonbinding nature of promises regarding
parental rights and duties or responsibilities. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-310(3) (2013) (stating “[a] term
in a premarital agreement or marital agreement which defines the rights or duties of the parties regarding
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waive the rights of third parties (their current or future children)” or
“to remove the jurisdiction or duty of the courts to protect the best
interests of minor children.”9 The Act’s Comment suggests, however,
that while such agreements are not always enforceable,10 they can
provide “guidance” to courts.11 Guidance promotes “stability and
permanence in family relationships because it allows the intended
parents to plan for . . . their child, reinforces the expectations of all
parties to the agreement, and reduces contentious litigation that could
drag on for . . . several years of the child’s life.”12 Guidance on
“custodial responsibility” should flow from premarital agreements
custodial responsibility is not binding on the court.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.2-09(3) (2013) (stating
a term that defines “the rights or duties of the parties regarding parental rights and responsibilities is not
binding on the court.”).
9. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 10, 9C U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 2014).
10. Id.
11. Id. (stating a court “might consider by way of guidance” certain contractual provisions, even
though the they are not binding on a court). Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 583(2)
(1932) (“A bargain by one parent to transfer the custody of a minor child to the other parent or not to
reclaim such custody is not illegal if the performance of the bargain is for the welfare of the child.”),
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (1981) (“A promise affecting the right of custody
of a minor child is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the disposition as to custody is
consistent with the best interest of the child.”), and In re Paternity of F.T.R., 2013 WI 66, ¶ 65, 349 Wis.
2d 84, 118, 833 N.W.2d 634, 651 (2013) (noting that parentage agreement involving a surrogate cannot
be enforced solely because it contemplates a voluntary termination of birth mother’s parental rights;
child custody and placement should be determined by the terms of the agreement unless enforcement is
contrary to the best interests of the child). On the emerging import of parentage pacts outside of prenups
and midnups, see, for example, Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of
Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2004); Linda D. Elrod, A Child’s
Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245 (2011).
12. In re Paternity of F.T.R., 2013 WI at ¶ 69, 349 Wis. 2d at 122, 833 N.W.2d at 652 (discussing
guidance found in a contract involving a dispute between intended parents and a contracting surrogate
and her husband). Seemingly, once guidance is sanctioned, there are differing possible levels of
deference to contractual terms. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 74, 349 Wis. 2d at 123, 833 N.W.2d at 653 (allowing
contract enforcement unless enforcement would be “contrary to the best interests” of the child). But see
2013 WI at ¶ 99, 349 Wis. 2d at 135, 833 N.W.2d at 659 (Abrahamson, C.J. concurring) (finding
majority’s holding “overly broad” and urging the court to follow statutory guidelines on children’s best
interests to resolve disputes between contracting parties). On why childcare pacts deserve significant
judicial deference, see Kimberly C. Emery & Robert E. Emery, Who Knows What Is Best for Our
Children? Honoring Agreements and Contracts Between Parents Who Live Apart, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 151, 154 (2014) (arguing that for married and non-married parents alike, judicial review of
parenting plans should be eliminated in the absence of child-protection concerns where parents agree).
On the benefits of recognizing early intentions on parentage, like prebirth declarations, see Dana
E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 210 (2012)
(highlighting that intent, as compared to marital presumption, biology, or functional theories, facilitates
family planning and should especially be available for establishing legal parentage in assisted
reproduction settings).
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(prenups) and marital agreements not contemplating separation or
dissolution (midnups)—even if no statute on such agreements exists
and even if any statute fails to address custodial responsibility.13
The Act implies that there can be guidance within prenups and
midnups on future child support for existing and future children.14 It
also implies that there can be guidance on future parentage within
such agreements to create or adopt children (child creation
agreements).15 States implementing the Act should expressly
recognize that prenups and midnups can address child support and
child creation as well as custodial responsibility.
When might child custody, child support, or child creation
promises within prenups and midnups be suitable for prospective and
current spouses16 and others? And when might prenups and midnups
13. In the absence of a statute, prenups and midnups are often enforced. See, e.g., Hodge v. Parks,
844 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (finding postnuptial agreement can be enforced where it is
“equitable to do so,” as long as a pact seeks to promote the marriage and not to end it).
14. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 10, U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 2014).
15. The paper does not address the procedural requirements for prenups and midnups on childcare,
child support, or child creation, which could include writing and realistic opportunities for consultations
with independent counsel and information disclosure duties. See, e.g., Maeker v. Ross, 62 A.3d 310
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013), rev’d, 99 A.3d 795 (N.J. 2014) (reviewing new statute guiding
palimony agreements); Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 871
(2005) (suggesting expanding disclosure duties when there are agreements between those who are
sexually intimate with a focus on unwed cohabitants). States remain free to differentiate between the
procedural requirements for prenups and midnups, as well as between property and child-related
provisions within prenups and midnups, although the Act urges the same set of principles. See UNIF.
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 3(a)(8), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983) (2012). The paper also
does not address “custodial responsibility” pacts involving obligations to abort, which would obviate
custody issues altogether. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1135 (2008); Dave Hoffman, The Unenforceability of Contracts to Abort,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 21, 2012), www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/09/theunenforceability-of-contracts-to-abort.html (discussing the dispute over the alleged surrogacy pact
involving Tagg Romney and his wife with a surrogate, wherein the Romneys’ would control the
abortion decision if the fetus or potential child “‘is determined to be physiologically, genetically or
chromosomally abnormal’”).
16. While custodial responsibility pacts between both prospective and current spouses are considered
herein, the two pacts can raise somewhat different legal issues and can be based on somewhat different
factual circumstances. Frequently, the law distinguishes current stepparents from future stepparents; for
example, some states that permit third-party standing to seek a childcare order or de facto parent status
allow only current stepparents to pursue childcare orders. Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(b) (1.5)
(1999) (allowing child visitation for stepparents during marriage dissolution where stepparents lived
with child for at least five years and child is at least twelve years old), with OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1)
(2013) (“[A]ny person, including but not limited to a . . . stepparent . . . who has established emotional
ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing personal relationship with a child,” may seek child
visitation or related order) (deemed unconstitutional as applied in a setting wherein a parent’s superior
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provide “guidance” to judges? This paper suggests that current and
future parents and stepparents17 could employ such agreements in
premarital, midmarital,18 civil union, and domestic partnership
settings19 to provide childcare guidance for post-dissolution
proceedings.20 Without such agreements, stepparents have far less
standing to seek childcare orders because of the superior parental
constitutional rights were not properly respected), and Harrington v. Daum, 18 P.3d 456, 460–61 (Or.
Ct. App. 2001). As to facts, prospective stepparents often are less likely to have lived, or to have lived as
long, in the same household with their future spouses and their children than are actual stepparents with
their current spouses and their children. Factual and public policy differences between prenups and
midnups on custodial responsibility may prompt states to vary the applicable principles, although the
Act urges that the requirements be the same.
17. In the absence of a prenup or midnup, on marriage dissolution former stepparents otherwise
often have little opportunity to seek childcare orders, even where the stepchildren’s best interests would
be served. See, e.g., 5/607(b)(1.5) (granting “reasonable visitation privileges” to stepparent if the child’s
best interests will be served; the child is at least twelve years old and wishes visitation; “the child
resided continuously with the parent and stepparent for at least 5 years”; the parent is “unable to care for
the child”; and the stepparent was providing childcare prior to seeking visitation). But see In re Marriage
of Garrity, 181 Cal. App. 3d 675, 682 n.9 (1986) (finding language in premarital pact indicating that “to
the greatest extent possible,” each future stepparent “‘will assume the role of parent to the other’s
children and shall treat the children of the other party as if they were his or her own’” did not imply the
parties agreed that they would each continue to rear their stepchildren should a divorce occur).
18. Premarital (as in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-35 (West 2002)) herein includes antenuptial (as in N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2-a (2004)) and prenuptial (as in TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-501 (2010)). See
also W. VA. CODE § 48-1-203 (2009) (stating antenuptial and prenuptial agreements have same
requirements). Midmarital herein includes, at times, marital (though not separation), nuptial, and
postnuptial pacts. See, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and
Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 324 (2012).
19. Some state statutory provisions on preceremony contracts already expressly cover staterecognized marriage-like relationships. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-31 (West 2002).
20. The paper distinguishes between midmarital (midnups) and postmarital pacts (and comparable
civil union, domestic partnership, and common law marriage pacts), with only the latter occurring in
contemplation of the dissolution of the relationship. The paper speaks only to midmarital pacts intending
to “promote harmonious marital relations,” and not to pacts in contemplation of dissolution. See, e.g.,
Hodge v. Parks, 844 N.W.2d 189, 193, 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (distinguishing the two types of
midnups and holding that only agreements promoting a continuing union of the couple will be enforced
if “equitable”). In re Placement of A.M.K. provides an example of a post-relationship pact pertaining to
childcare and formed between a birth parent and one who developed a parent-like relationship. In re
Placement of A.M.K., No. 2011AP2660, 2013 WL. No. at *1 (Wis. App. Sept. 5, 2013) (granting
nonbiological parent visitation over her former same-sex partner who was the birth mother, and who
made a Troxel objection, which assumed superior parental rights doctrine applied). Often pacts
contemplating the imminent end of a state-recognized relationship are called separation agreements.
Concededly, it will be difficult at times to differentiate between midmarital and postmarital pacts. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Auriemma, No. 2-13-0643, 2014 WL, 130643-U at *7 (Ill. App. Mar. 12, 2014)
appeal docketed, No. 117869 (Ill. Sept. 8, 2014) (finding “post marital agreement” after wife’s marriage
dissolution petition voluntarily dismissed, although agreement said her petition was pending; August of
2004 agreement followed by husband’s November of 2012 petition for marriage dissolution). For an
argument that courts should give greater deference to postmarital (or separation) pacts on child custody,
see Sarah Abramowicz, Contractualizing Custody, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 67 (2014).
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rights of the existing parents, even if the existing parents do not
intend to accommodate a child’s best interests.21 The paper also
suggests that childcare pacts in prenups and midnups can guide other
current and future family members, like grandparents, aunts, and
uncles,22 who later wish to obtain childcare interests.23
In some states, the law already aids stepparents, grandparents, and
other child caretakers in noncontract settings where their earlier acts,
such as holding out children as their own, guide their later childcare
standing as parents or parental-like figures.24 Prenups and midnups
could provide childcare interests for additional child caretakers, such
as aunts, uncles, or cousins, who otherwise would have no parental or
third party standing to seek a childcare order upon dissolution.25
21. Agreements waiving or limiting parents’ future childcare interests, of course, may be approached
differently than agreements assuming future childcare interests by nonparents. Yet distinguishing
between parents and nonparents in contract settings are sometimes difficult. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117
P.3d 673, 676, 682 (Cal. 2005) (emphasizing that ova donor’s waiver of future childcare interests, so her
lesbian partner could bear a child to be raised jointly in a single home with the donor, did not foreclose
donor’s pursuit of childcare over birth mother’s objection after partnership dissolved; as child’s right to
support cannot be abrogated by parent’s contract, parental rights were not relinquished here (especially
if it is true, as the donor testified, that she only first saw the waiver ten minutes before she signed and
“did not intend to relinquish her rights,” although she found parts of the form “odd”)).
22. In the absence of a prenup or midnup, on marriage dissolution, grandparents often have little
opportunity to seek childcare orders even when the grandchildren’s best interests would be served. See,
e.g., E.H.G. v. E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 614, 628–29 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (reviewing American state cases
and finding Alabama grandparent visitation statute requires grandparents seeking childcare order over
parental objections to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that the denial of the requested visitation
would harm the child.”). Post-dissolution standing is even more difficult for other current or former
family members because special statutes typically do not even speak directly to aunts, uncles, cousins,
or comparable relations. See discussion infra Part III–V.
23. See discussion infra Part III–V.
24. As to stepparents, consider the differences between DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 733 (2009)
(stating that a stepparent, who resides with “a custodial or primary placement parent” and dies or
becomes disabled, can seek “permanent custody or primary physical placement,” even if there is a
surviving, fit, natural parent) and tit.13, § 8-201(c) (noting that de facto parent status for one who, with
“a parent-like relationship” with “the support and consent of the child’s parent,” exercised “parental
responsibility” and “acted in a parental role” so as to establish “a bonded and dependent relationship that
is parental in nature.”).
As to grandparents, consider KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (a) (West 2006) (de facto
custodian), applied to paternal grandparents in J.L.A. v. S.C., No. 2012-CA-000758-ME, 2013 WL
843815 *3–4 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).
25. Without prenups or midnups, for example, former stepparents and their parents are often left
without standing to pursue a childcare order regardless of children’s best interests. See, e.g., 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/607(b)(1.5) (1999) (granting “reasonable visitation privileges” to stepparent if child’s
best interests will be served; the child is at least twelve years old and wishes visitation; “the child
resided continuously with the parent and stepparent for at least 5 years”; the parent is “unable to care for
the child,” and; the stepparent was providing childcare prior to seeking visitation). Without prenups or
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Judicial decisions on stepparent, grandparent, and other childcare
standing arising from prenups and midnups must always account for
public concerns for children’s best interests.26 This paper asks how
these public concerns may be furthered because it finds that absolute
post-dissolution judicial discretion as to who should actually be
responsible for childcare, given an earlier custodial responsibility
pact, may not fully protect children.27 The paper posits that more
definite rules are needed to address who is eligible to attain childcare
standing using prenups and midnups, not unlike eligibility rules for
formal adoptions.28 These rules would further guide judges who are
already guided by custodial responsibility pacts.
As to child support pacts, superior parental rights, and public
concerns about children’s interests pose fewer problems.29 In general,
additional financial support to a child should not negatively impact
parent-provided childcare.30 Public policy does not allow money
alone—however beneficial to a child—to form the basis for childcare
standing.31 Further, as to consideration benefitting the future child
supporters, several existing state statutes already declare that
promises to furnish child support, growing out of a supposed,
presumed, or alleged parent-child relationship, typically do not
require consideration.32
midnups, a dissolution prompted by one spouse’s death leaves the parents of the deceased spouse
without standing to seek childcare because the grandparents’ childcare standing is only “derivative.”
See, e.g., Scudder v. Ramsey, 426 S.W.3d 427, 433 (Ark. 2013).
26. Should the stepparents and grandparents never be elevated to parental status, and thus be third
parties or nonparents in childcare settings, they may occasionally obtain custodial responsibility orders
unaccompanied by child support orders. See, e.g., Weinand v. Weinand, 616 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2000)
(finding former stepparent gets childcare order, but is not ordered to pay child support where both
biological parents are raising the child).
27. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000). See discussion infra Part III.
28. See discussion infra Part III.
29. See discussion infra Part IV.
30. ALI Principles, supra note 7, at § 3.03(1)(a). The ALI Principles only allow an imposition of
parental support obligations in “exceptional cases.” Id.
31. Id. The ALI Principles recognize a support obligation may be judicially imposed on a nonparent,
who expressly or implicitly agreed or undertook “to assume a parental support obligation to the child.”
Id.
32. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7614(a) (West 2013) (rendering enforceable a “promise in writing”
growing out of a “presumed . . . or alleged” relationship, even without consideration); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 584-22(a) (2008) (requiring a “promise in writing . . . growing out of a supposed or alleged”
relationship); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.900(1) (2010) (requiring a writing and “supposed or alleged”
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Child creation agreements significantly implicate superior parental
rights and other federal constitutional interests (like paternity
opportunity interests), as well as public policy concerns.33 Statutes
and common law rulings already respect certain child creation pacts
involving assisted human reproduction (AHR), with and without
surrogates, outside of prenups and midnups.34 This paper suggests
that child creation prenups or midnups should also guide the courts.35
I. SUPERIOR PARENTAL RIGHTS
Federal constitutional interests significantly limit the breadth of
parentage prenups and midnups on future childcare, child support,
and child creation.36 Prenups and midnups that address the future
childcare of existing children clearly implicate superior parental
rights.37 Contracts that involve only one of a child’s two parents
especially implicate the noncontracting parent’s constitutional
childcare interests.38 Childcare contracts can also implicate the
constitutionally protected familial interests of contracting and
noncontracting nonparents and of the children themselves.39

relationship); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-58(a) (West 2013) (requiring a writing and “supposed or alleged”
relationship).
33. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model for
Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 419, 425–28 (2013).
34. Id. at 418.
35. See infra Part V. The Act’s drafters have provided little guidance about how prenups and
midnups on custodial responsibility, childcare standing, child support, or child creation should guide
courts. But the general sentiments behind the Act seemingly reflect the view that prenups and midnups
will generally be relevant only to issues of money. Atwood & Bix, supra note 18, at 344 (“In general,
courts will not enforce provisions relating to topics beyond the parties’ financial obligations inter se.”).
36. Jeffrey A. Parness, Parental Law (R)evolution: The Key Questions, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 743, 747
(2013).
37. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 305–06 (Ohio 2011).
38. Id.
39. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Beyond parents, there is little recognition
to date of constitutionally protected family-related childcare interests of others. Id. Justice Stevens did
note, in dissent, that because at least some children in nonparent childcare settings likely “have
fundamental liberty interests” in “preserving established familial or family-like bonds,” nonparents
seeking childcare orders (here, grandparents) must be distinguished by whether there is a “presence or
absence of some embodiment of family.” Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It may also be that similar
fundamental liberty interests in family bond preservation are held by other nonparents, including
grandparents, siblings, and foster parents. Id. at 93.
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Prenups and midnups on future child support seem less constrained
by federal constitutional interests.40 Yet, substantive due process does
limit certain agreements.41
Prenups and midnups that address future parentage creation,
whether through formal or informal adoption, assisted reproduction,
or otherwise, often implicate both the superior parental rights and
familial interests of the contracting parties as well as the interests of
others, including surrogates and children.42
While federal constitutional rights undoubtedly constrain
parentage prenups and midnups that address childcare, child support,
and child creation, the rights have not been fully defined.43 Troxel v.
Granville demonstrated childcare pacts’ uncertainties.44 In Troxel, six
U.S. Supreme Court justices found the State of Washington’s thirdparty child visitation statute was unconstitutional because it unduly
interfered with parental rights to direct the upbringing of their
children.45 Washington’s third-party visitation statute effectively
permitted any third party to petition a court to review any parent’s
decision concerning child visitation under a best interest standard.46
The Troxel plurality of four held the “breathtakingly broad” statute
was unconstitutional because it failed to presume fit parents act in the
best interests of their children or to give any deference to parental
decisions.47 A judicial determination of a child’s best interest could
not warrant court-ordered visitation when the law accords “no special
weight” to parental decisions because the federal constitution
40. Baker, supra note 11, at 7.
41. Atwood & Bix, supra note 18, at 319.
42. See, e.g., Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek
Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 12–13 (2013).
43. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. 57. Of course, states can supplement federal constitutional rights,
which can, for example, extend further the superior parental rights or recognize parent creation rights
with no federal counterpart. See, e.g., Jensen v. Cunningham, 250 P.3d 465, 478 (Utah 2011) (holding
state constitutional liberty interests are not identical to comparable federal constitutional liberty
interests, and the state can provide parents certain rights where state interferes with parental control over
childcare [here medical] decision-making, even where the federal and state constitutional language is
“substantially the same”).
44. See generally Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
45. Id. at 66–67, 76–77, 80.
46. Id. at 67 (plurality opinion).
47. Id. The need for both a presumption and some deference has been read as required by Troxel in
grandparent visitation cases. See, e.g., Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634 (Ala. 2011).
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embodies “a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of
their children.”48 The Troxel plurality hinted that nonparent visitation
orders would be constitutional when “special weight” is accorded to
parental wishes.49 The Court did not, however, discuss the weight
that should be accorded to childcare pacts. The Troxel plurality
condemned judicial interference with parents any time there was
“mere disagreement” regarding a child’s best interest.50 The plurality
did not expressly find, as the Washington high court did, that a
showing of harm or potential harm was necessary to sustain
nonparent visitation over parental objection.51
Concurring, Justice Souter focused only on what the plurality
characterized as a “breathtakingly broad” statute,52 which he
described as authorizing any person at any time to petition for and to
receive visitation rights subject only to a free-ranging, best-interestsof-the-child standard.53 He chose to “say no more,”54 and thus did not

48. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69. The constitutional presumption that parents act in the best interest of
their children was important to the Troxel plurality because the grandparents seeking visitation did not
allege, and no court found, that the parent was unfit. Id. at 68.
49. Id. at 69. In New Hampshire, “special weight” means a nonparent must show, to obtain courtordered childcare, “by clear and convincing evidence,” that such an order is the child’s best interests,
meaning it promotes “the child’s ‘essential physical and safety needs,’” with adverse consequences to
the child’s psychological well-being if there is no order. In re Guardianship of Reena D., 35 A.3d 509,
511, 514 (N.H. 2011) (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463:8(3)(b) (2004)).
50. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 72 (noting the dispute involves nothing more than a simple disagreement
between the Washington Superior Court and the mother concerning her children’s best interest).
51. Id. at 73, 77. Today, harm or potential harm is often required. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Hernandez,
265 P.3d 495, 500 (Idaho 2011) (holding a statute that allows grandparents to seek custody without a
threshold showing of parental unfitness not facially unconstitutional after Troxel). When harm or
potential harm is required, there is some disagreement about whether the burden of proof is
preponderance or clear and convincing evidence. Hollis v. Miller, No. 10-022075-DZ, 2012 WL
6097307, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2012) (Gleicher, J., concurring) (“I write separately to
respectfully express my belief that a grandparent must establish by clear and convincing evidence, rather
than by a preponderance of the evidence, that denial of visitation substantially risks harm to the child.”).
At times, statutes presume that severing a relationship between a child and grandparent will cause the
child substantial harm. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-306(b)(4) (2010) (“[I]f the child’s parent is
deceased and the grandparent seeking visitation is the parent of that deceased parent, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child based upon the cessation of the relationship
between the child and grandparent.”).
52. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
53. Id. at 76 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating the Court should affirm the Washington Supreme
Court).
54. Id. at 75.
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comment on the constitutionality of a more narrowly drawn statute or
on any necessary “special weight” or “presumption.”55
Justice Thomas in his concurrence simply noted, “Washington
lacks even a legitimate governmental interest—to say nothing of a
compelling one—in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding
visitation with third parties.”56 However, a parent’s earlier agreement
to share visitation was not at issue.
The three dissenters filed separate opinions. Justice Stevens stated
that it would have been wise to deny certiorari.57 As to the statute, he
found its terms were “unconstrued” by the state high court so that a
remand was in order.58 He noted the majority had not cited an
adequate “basis for holding that the statute is invalid in all its
applications.”59 “[A] facial challenge should fail,” Justice Stevens
observed, if a statute has a “‘plainly legitimate sweep.’”60 Whether
such a sweep could encompass a childcare pact was not explored.
In dissent, Justice Scalia, while recognizing an “unenumerated
right . . . of parents to direct the upbringing of their children,”61
previously protected by substantive due process,62 nevertheless
opined that any additional limits on this right are best determined “in
legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns” and not in courts.63
He warned that recognizing further opportunities for judicial review
of parental actions would require the court to formulate a “judicially
55. Id. at 77 (“There is no need to decide whether harm is required or to consider the precise scope
of the parent’s right or its necessary protections.”).
56. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 84–85.
59. Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 85 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739–40, n.7 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
61. Id. at 91–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the right is among both the “unalienable” rights
recognized in the Declaration of Independence and is one of the rights retained by the people under the
Ninth Amendment).
62. Id. at 92 (noting that two of the three opinions from the Court originated in “an era rich in
substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated”).
63. Id. at 91–92 (noting that while it is “entirely compatible with the commitment to representative
democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral
campaigns” about parental childrearing authority, “[Justice Scalia] do[es] not believe that the power
which the Constitution confers upon [him] as a judge entitles [him] to deny legal effect to laws that (in
[his] view) infringe upon what is (in [his] view) that unenumerated right.”).
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crafted definition of parents,”64 “judicially approved assessments of
‘harm to the child,’”65 and “judicially defined gradations of other
persons (grandparents, extended family, adoptive family in an
adoption later found to be invalid, long-term guardians, etc.)” who
can seek childcare notwithstanding parental objections.66 He had no
desire for “a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally
prescribed, family law.”67 Thus, for Justice Scalia, state statutes
should regulate childcare pacts.
Justice Kennedy, in dissent, thought the Court should remand the
case so that the state courts could consider whether, and to what
extent, child visits with nonparents—or just grandparents—might be
ordered over parental objections because the visits served the
children’s best interests as well as whether child harm “is required in
every instance.”68 He opined that a “harm to the child standard” is
not always required by the Constitution when nonparent visits are
ordered,69 recognizing that “the conventional nuclear family . . . is
simply not the structure or prevailing condition in many
households.”70 He observed there may be “a substantial number of
cases—in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child
which is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto,”71 and
suggested that such a third party might be deemed a “de facto”
parent.72 However, any connection between such possible de facto
parenthood and childcare pacts was not discussed.
Since Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken again on
how superior parental rights limit state legislatures and judges from
recognizing childcare interests by nonparents, be they grandparents
64. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92.
65. Id. at 93.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 94.
69. Id. at 101–02.
70. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98.
71. Id. at 98, 100–01 (“In short, a fit parent’s right vis-à-vis a complete stranger is one thing: her
right vis-à-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.”).
72. Id. at 100–01. The ALI Principles suggest gradations of parents, including a legal parent, a de
facto parent, and a parent by estoppel. ALI Principles, supra note 7, at § 2.03.
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or others (like former stepparents), over parental objections. The
court has not clarified how contracts between—and voluntary actions
involving—parents and nonparents might allow nonparents to obtain
childcare standing for existing children.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also not spoken on child support
contracts or similar voluntary actions involving existing or future
children. And it has not spoken on child creation contracts or similar
voluntary actions between prospective parents, and perhaps others,
who anticipate future pregnancy or adoption.
II. CURRENT WAIVERS OF SUPERIOR PARENTAL RIGHTS
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken on superior parental
rights since Troxel, many state legislatures and courts have spoken on
the partial or total waivers of such rights, often with differing
results.73 State lawmakers have not significantly addressed parental
rights waivers in prenups and midnups on child custody, child
support, and child creation. Parental rights waivers are, however,
often recognized in state laws outside of prenups and midnups that
address both contractual and noncontractual conduct involving future
childcare, child support, and child creation.74
A. Prenups and Midnups
While the Act now expressly recognizes that prenups and midnups
may speak to “custodial responsibility,”75 some earlier American
state premarital agreement statutes recognized that prenups could
address “personal” matters. In both Arizona76 and Illinois77 before the
Act, persons undertaking premarital agreements could, by statute,
“contract with respect to . . . any . . . matter, including . . . personal
73. See, e.g., In re Paternity of F.T.R., 2013 WI 66, ¶ 2, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 94, 833 N.W.2d 634, 639
n.2 (Wis. 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-611 (2013).
74. § 42-2-611; TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 161.103 (West 2014).
75. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 10(a), 9C U.L.A. 27 (2012) (treating
“premarital agreements and marital agreements under the same set of principles and requirements.”).
76. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 25-203(A)(8) (2007).
77. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4(a)(8) (1999).
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rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute
imposing a criminal penalty.”78 Distinguishing between property and
personal matters can, however, be tricky.79 There was even less
statutory authority before the Act on midnups addressing personal
matters.80
Before and since the Act, a few cases have addressed the effects of
prenups on personal matters involving custodial responsibility.81
Some agreements only indirectly spoke to future childcare. For
example, when parties litigate parenting plans, some courts have not
enforced general attorney fee waivers because, if enforced, the
waivers had a potential to create a non-level playing field, making
judicial childcare decisions problematic.82 Another case involving
prenups that directly addressed future childcare disputes held that
such agreements are not enforceable in an equity proceeding where
the spouses do not seek marriage dissolution.83
Some prenups that were raised in marriage dissolution proceedings
prior to the Act directly addressed future childcare and involved
78. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 25-203(A)(8) (2007); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4(a)(8) (1999). These
provisions seemingly are grounded on the 1983 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, at Section 3(a)(8).
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(8) 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983). The Comment to the Section
declares that a premarital agreement could “provide for . . . the upbringing of children.” In New Mexico,
premarital pacts may contain “any . . . matter not in violation of public policy.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 403A-4(A)(7) (2013).
79. Consider, for example, prenups and midnups on dispositions of human embryos on marriage
dissolution. See, e.g., Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Assisted Reproductive
Technology: A Look at the Disposition of Embryos in Divorce, FAM. LAW. MAG., July 23, 2013, at 54,
available at ssrn.com/abstract=2297561 (explaining that most courts have not used a property approach,
and from their survey of cases, many embryo contracts are executed at fertility clinics, and not in
prenups or midnups).
80. As states implement the Act’s policy regarding guidance within custodial responsibility pacts,
the new laws may only be applied prospectively. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Howell, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d
539 (Ct. App. 2011) (specifying that the requirement for independent counsel for prenup parties who
waive future spousal support is not retroactive). But see Maeker v. Ross, 62 A.3d 310, 316 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2013) (finding new statute of frauds requirement for palimony agreements applied
retroactively (i.e., to pacts undertaken before statutory amendment) because legislators wanted its
application “irrespective of when an agreement . . . may have been entered.”).
81. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burke, 980 P.2d 265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
82. See, e.g., id. at 267; In re Marriage of Heinrich, 7 N.E.3d 889, 905–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)
(holding an agreement’s attorney fee shifting clause violates public policy because it discourages
parents from pursuing child’s best interests in litigation).
83. Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 887–88 (Ala. 1958) (finding as a matter of fact that parents
stated in antenuptial agreement that all children of the marriage are to be baptized and educated in the
religion of the father, whether he is living or dead).
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religious training.84 In one case, an oral prenup required both spouses
to raise any children from the marriage in a particular faith, but did
not bar a divorced spouse with partial physical custody from taking
the children to religious services that involved a different faith.85
Among the rationales for the prenup was a concern about violating
free exercise rights and parental authority over “religious
upbringing.”86
There are also some pre-Act precedents on midnups that address
personal matters involving childcare. In one case, a midnup provided
that, in the event of dissolution, any marital child “shall remain in the
custody of the parent of that progeny’s sex.”87 This provision was
held invalid as “against public policy” because it impermissibly
restricted judicial authority over future childcare and thereby
disallowed any consideration of a child’s best interests.88
Personal matters seemingly can encompass future child support
obligations, future parentage, and future childcare.89 Child support
usually does not implicate superior parental rights.90 It should be
easier to overcome nonparents’ complaints of due process property
deprivations than the complaints of existing parents, who oppose
nonparent or new parent childcare and who complain of superior
rights infringements.91 Prenups and midnups do not usually address
future nonparent child support pledges or nonparent or new parent
84. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
85. Id. at 1140.
86. Id. at 1138 (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972)). Other rationales included the indefiniteness of the agreement and lack of contractual
intent. Id. at 1145–46. Cf. Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 112 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942)
(upholding prenup providing for education of children in a certain religion); Shearer v. Shearer, 73
N.Y.S.2d 337, 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (employing Ramon). A different rationale could be employed
where enforcement of prenups’ religious upbringing clauses are needed to serve the children’s best
interests. See, e.g., Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Mass. 1997) (finding exposure to
second religion would cause damage to children’s self-identity because during religious services
opinions are voiced that nonbelievers are “‘damned to go to hell.’”).
87. Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 52 (Wyo. 1993).
88. Id. at 54.
89. Parness, supra note 36, at 750.
90. Id. However, “[i]f unwritten consent to parent with the birth mother can prompt a second parent,
there are concerns not only about respecting the birth mother’s superior parental rights but also about
whether the second parent is unduly saddled with child support duties.” Id.
91. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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childcare, perhaps, in part because the Model Act only first spoke
directly to custodial responsibility pacts in 2012.92
B. Waivers By Other Agreements
Beyond prenups and midnups, express agreements between
parents, or between a future parent and a nonparent, could help
prompt a partial waiver of superior parental rights so that, over the
parent’s later objections, a court may later recognize the contracting
nonparent as a second parent or imbue the contracting nonparent, or
another person (like the contracting nonparent’s parent), with
standing to seek childcare. Childcare pacts in these settings can help
resolve the “guidance” issues in prenup and midnup settings.93
It is hard to imagine that an agreement between a parent and
nonparent could prompt a court to recognize second parent status for
a nonparent who is not a party to the agreement. It is also difficult to
imagine that an agreement between two recognized parents and a
nonparent would today prompt third parent status for the contracting
nonparent, or for any other nonparent, because American states
typically demand there be only two parents for any one child at any
one time.94
Statutes that address express childcare or child support agreements
could include coparenting and cohabitation pacts between unwed
partners; such coparenting and cohabitation pacts could specify the
92. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 10, 9C U.L.A. 27–28 (Supp. 2014).
93. Partial parental rights waivers in other contractual settings seem less helpful to prenup or midnup
analyses. Consider, for example, contracts envisioning possible post-adoption visitation opportunities
for—or child development updates to—parents whose children are adopted by nonfamily members. See,
e.g., In re Andie B., 955 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (finding post-adoption contact orders
for birth parents permissible in both private placement adoptions and adoptions from authorized
agency); Carol Sanger, Bargaining for Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 309, 339 (2012) (suggesting different approaches when there are “heroic birth mother[s] doing
the best for everyone” and “bad” mothers, whose parental rights are terminated).
94. See, e.g., Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 743 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (finding no de facto
parenthood for mother’s boyfriend because child already had legal mother and legal father, and third
parent recognition would impermissibly interfere with childcare interests of the two fit parents). But see
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2013) (allowing more than two parents if finding otherwise would be
detrimental to the child); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617(b) (West 2013) (allowing prospective adoptive
parent(s) and existing parent(s) to agree for existing parents’ “duties and responsibilities” to continue);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(d) (West 2004) (allocating custody and visitation where child has more than
two parents).
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care or support for one partner’s child and could stipulate that the
biological parent will be the only recognized parent under law.95
Such pacts may be pre or post cohabitation or coparentage. To date,
there are no statutes directly on point.96 Without statutes, case law
interpreting cohabitation or coparentage agreements can serve as
precedent for cases involving prenups or midnups on courtcompelled childcare that overrides superior parental rights. Case law
can also serve as precedent for cases involving prenups and midnups
on court-compelled child support that overrides the nonparent’s
objections. Informal coparenting and cohabitation agreements about
later childcare or child support for existing children include pacts that
indicate the parties will act in all ways as a family unit, with each
party having the same or similar privileges and obligations.
Informal childcare and child support agreements among existing
parents and nonparents (including stepparents and grandparents) are
today effectively enforceable through the de facto parent and
presumed parent doctrines, and similar statutes.97 At times, actual
“agreement” is required.98
In Delaware, courts recognize a de facto parent where one had “a
parent-like relationship” with “the support and consent of the child’s
parent”; the individual exercised “parental responsibility”; and the
individual “acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to
have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child
that is parental in nature.”99 Not all de facto parents are actually
95. The status as the sole legal parent may be apparent at the time of the agreement, as when the
other natural parent is deceased, or may be uncertain, as when an unwed, natural father has assumed or
will assume a custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child prompting parenthood under
state law. Elrod, supra note 11, at 247.
96. The American Law Institute has suggested, however, that courts could allocate custodial and
decision-making responsibilities for children to nonparents under law if they are “biological,” nonlegal
parents who have agreements with legal parents under which the nonlegal parents “retained some
parental rights or responsibilities.” ALI Principles, supra note 7, at § 2.18(2)(b).
97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201 (2006); D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2013); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7611(c–d) (West 2013).
98. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2013) (requiring that the individual has “held himself or
herself out as the child’s parent with the agreement of the child’s parent”).
99. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-201(a)(4) (2006) (mother), 8-201(b)(6) (father), & 8-201(c)
(outlining three requirements to attain “de facto parent status”). De facto parents are on equal footing
with biological or adoptive parents. See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 924, 928 (Del. 2011). But
see In re Bancroft, 19 A.3d 730, 731 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (finding statute overbroad and violative of fit
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parents however. In the District of Columbia, one can seek “thirdparty custody” as a “de facto parent” if, among other requirements,
one lived with the child at the child’s birth or lived in the same
household with the child for at least ten of the twelve months
preceding the filing of one’s custody request with parental
“agreement.”100
Presumed parent laws also differ—and often operate—although
there is no “agreement” about childcare or support.101 Outside of
marriage, presumed parent laws may be founded on presumed natural
ties or only on the parental-like acts of nonparents.102 In Nevada, a
“man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if . . . he and the
child’s natural mother were cohabiting for at least 6 months before
the period of conception and continued to cohabit through the period
of conception.”103 Neither preconception or postconception but
prebirth acts are needed in Montana, where a presumption of natural
fatherhood arises for a “person” who, “while the child is under the
age of majority[,] . . . receives the child into the person’s home and
openly represents the child to be the person’s natural child.”104
Although Alabama law makes a similar presumption, it does not
presume the “man” has natural ties; he must have established “a
significant parental relationship with the child by providing
emotional and financial support for the child.”105 Texas law presumes
a man to be the father of a child—though not the natural father—
”if . . . during the first two years of the child’s life, he continuously
resided in the household in which the child resided and he
represented to others that the child was his own.”106 In Washington,
mother and father’s due process rights as it relates to the mother’s boyfriend’s seeking to be a third
parent).
100. D.C. CODE §§ 16-831.01, 831.03 (2013).
101. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2013).
102. §§ 16-831.01, 831.03.
103. NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.051(1)(b) (2010).
104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(d) (West 2013). See also, COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105(1)(d)
(2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(4) (West 2013). Accord CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2013)
(making no reference to under majority age, but “child” is received into home).
105. ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2009).
106. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2014). See also, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8204(a)(5) (2006) (“resided in the same household”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-20-10(1)(e) (2009);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-204(a)(5) (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-204(A)(5) (2009); and WYO.
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“a person is presumed to be the parent of a child if, for the first two
years of the child’s life, the person resided in the same household
with the child and openly held out the child as his or her own.”107
At times, courts read parentage presumptions—even those
involving natural ties and second parent status for a child with an
existing parent—to include the post-birth, parent-like acts of a
woman who is not the birth mother,108 putting the intimate partners of
single-parent mothers who childrear in certain ways on equal footing
regardless of sex.109
Where there are not yet children, coparenting and cohabitation
pacts may primarily address child creation while also contemplating
childcare and child support.110 Pacts can address one partner’s future
pregnancy through assisted reproduction, with or without gametes of
the other partner, and outline future childcare and support.111 Such
agreements can also address future child creation, childcare, and
child support for children born to gestational carriers who, as
surrogates, might have no parental rights or obligations.112
Some states’ statutes address agreements on future pregnancy
through assisted reproduction, with or without surrogates.113 Many of
these statutes, however, do not speak directly to all possible child
creation pacts, as they are sometimes limited, for example, to
married, opposite-sex couples114 or to persons with certain medical
STAT. ANN., § 14-2-504(a)(v) (2013).
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.116(2) (2011).
108. See, e.g., In re Domestic Partnership of C.P., No. E052672, 2013 WL 2099156, at *2 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 16, 2013) (reviewing California cases).
109. Id.
110. See Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 545–46 (Kan. 2013).
111. Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 508, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (“We therefore join those
courts that have held that ‘[a]greements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of
their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between
them.’” (quoting Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998)).
112. Parness, supra note 36, at 747 n.16.
113. See Susan L. Crockin, Where Is Anonymous Reproduction Taking Us Now?, 12 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 241 (2009) (reviewing American state statutes on parentage from assisted human
reproduction (AHR) births without surrogates). See also, Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money:
Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1250–65 (2013) (reviewing American state statutes
on parentage from AHR births with surrogates).
114. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(a) (2012); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3111.89 (West 2011). The Parentage Act in Illinois, a state only recently allowing
marriage for same-sex couples, only guides births to wives from AHR where the husbands consent. 40/2
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conditions.115 Where pacts go beyond the explicit statutes, 116 courts
do not always enforce the agreements.117
In states without statutes that address assisted reproduction pacts,
the courts have enforced child creation pacts but have urged
legislators to take action.118 Enforcement is impossible, however,
(husbands are semen donors); 40/3(a) (husbands are not the semen donors). By contrast, in Ohio there is
a separate statutory scheme dealing with “non-spousal artificial insemination for the purpose of
impregnating a woman so that she can bear a child that she intends to raise as her child”; however, the
section expressly states, “[t]hese sections do not deal with the artificial insemination of a wife with the
semen of her husband or with surrogate motherhood.” § 3111.89.
115. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b)(2) (2012). The Gestational Surrogacy Act in Illinois
only recognizes surrogacy contracts when, among other things, there is a “medical need for the
gestational surrogacy” by at least one intended parent. Id. By contrast gestational agreements are
authorized in Texas without a showing of any medical need on the part of the intended parents. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754 (West 2014).
116. See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731, 739 (Ark. 2011) (holding it was in child’s best
interest to have visitation with biological mother’s former same sex partner, who stood in loco parentis
to child.); In re T.P.S., No. 5-12-0438, 2013 WL 827539, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 4, 2013) (determining
non-birthmother may be able to continue to maintain childcare rights per an earlier joint guardianship
established with the birthmother); In re T.P.S., 978 N.E.2d 1070, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (finding a
same-sex partner can seek custody per common law contract theory although the statute on assisted
human reproduction covered only married couples); Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 557–58 (Kan.
2013) (enforcing prebirth coparenting agreements of a lesbian couple involving children born of assisted
reproduction over the objection of birth mother); L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 721–22 (Va. 2013)
(finding opposite-sex, unwed couple’s pact on birth via assisted reproduction enforceable and refusing
to adopt a per se rule that sperm donor’s due process rights never warranted protection). Compare In re
Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ohio 2011) (finding mother never agreed that former domestic partner
would permanently share legal custody though there was coparentage for a while), with Brown v.
Wyandt, No. 8-13-08, 2014 WL 222820, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2014) (finding In re Mullen does
not provide for a statutory “shared parenting” arrangement between a parent and nonparent, but does
recognize that a parent can enter a “valid shared custody agreement” with a nonparent, here a man, who
cannot prove such an agreement with the birth mother).
117. See, e.g., Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601, 602–03 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). The
enforceability of such pacts often will not be considered such as where the parentage effects of child
creations are addressed outside any contractual circumstances. Id. (holding same-sex, unwed, female
couple that facilitated the pregnancy of one partner via artificial insemination were both parents,
reasoning the child was born after the couple married).
118. In re Paternity of F.T.R., 2013 WI 66, ¶ 73, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 123, 833 N.W.2d 634, 653 (Wis.
2013) (enforcing most of surrogacy pact between two couples, wherein birth mother agreed to parental
rights termination, while urging legislature “to consider enacting legislation regarding surrogacy” as it
“is currently a reality in our . . . court system.”). See also S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 472 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2010) (finding gestational surrogacy contract rebuts maternity under parentage statute arising from
giving birth). Not all pacts involving future childcare are enforced. See, e.g., A.C. v. N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685,
697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding agreement between same-sex, domestic partners on dual parentage
unenforceable, but nonparent has standing to seek child visitation for child conceived artificially with
her brother’s sperm); Dee v. Rakower, 976 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473, 476, 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (holding
there is no enforcement of oral partnership or joint venture pact between same-sex parents, who litigate
post-breakup property division, where one parent contracted to forego her career to care for the couple’s
children).
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when statutes expressly forbid certain contracts such as surrogacy
agreements.119
Where there are not yet children, coparenting and cohabitation
pacts could primarily address future formal adoption and subsequent
childcare and child support. Such pacts can include agreements that
contemplate the situation in which one person undertakes a formal
adoption and then coparents with a second person. While no statutes
explicitly address such a scenario, some cases have addressed
coparenting and cohabitation pacts that anticipate a future
adoption.120
Beyond prenups, midnups, and cohabitation and coparentage pacts,
statutes could explicitly address, for example, parent-grandparent
pacts on grandparent childcare and support.121 Such laws could
appear in statutes on marriage dissolution, paternity, third party
visitation, or grandparent visitation proceedings. To date there are no
statutes on such express contracts.122 Courts have, however, upheld
some child visitation agreements between grandparents and
parents.123 Similarly, courts have upheld some child visitation
agreements between soon-to-be former stepparents and parents.124
119. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2011) (“A surrogate parentage contract is void and
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”).
120. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mancine, 965 N.E.2d 592, 594–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (rejecting a de
facto parent argument by a cohabitant, who later became a stepfather after the Illinois Supreme Court
remanded for consideration of whether an intent to adopt, without a formal adoption, can prompt
childcare standing for the former cohabitant and then husband), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Mancine v. Gansner, 992 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2013).
121. Parent-aunt, parent-uncle, and parent-child sibling pacts could also be addressed, as it can be
easily imagined that such pacts should lead to, for example, childcare orders over parental objections.
122. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-203 (2007); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4 (2012); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-4 (2006).
123. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392, 399–400 (Ill. 2004), where the court enforced an earlier
consent decree involving grandparent visitation over later parental objection (after the grandparent
visitation statute was stricken), with the court saying:
The constitution prohibits the state from forcing fit parents to yield visitation rights to a
child’s grandparents when the parents do not wish to do so merely because a trial judge
believes that such visitation would be appropriate. There is no corresponding
constitutional prohibition against a fit parent’s decision to voluntarily bestow visitation
privileges on his child’s grandparents. To the contrary, the very constitutional principles
that required us to strike down the grandparent visitation statute . . . require that a
parent’s voluntary visitation decision be honored. If fit parents have a fundamental right
to make decisions regarding the care custody and control of their children . . . they must
likewise have the fundamental right to agree to visitation by the children’s grandparents
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It appears that grandparents’ child support pledges to parents could
also be sustained. More problematic, however, is the prospect that a
grandparent’s financial support of child creation could, over parental
objection, give rise to second parent status or prompt later courtcompelled grandparent childcare.125 Childcare opportunities should
not normally be for sale in child creation settings.
C. Waivers By Noncontractual Conduct
Beyond agreements, non-contractual conduct can prompt partial
waivers of superior parental rights to childcare.126 Waiver standards
in a noncontract setting, as well as the coparentage and cohabitation
settings, can help guide waiver issues in prenup and midnup settings.
Where there were no agreements, inquiries into any earlier single
parents’ consent to future childcare by nonparents have proved
crucial in many cases and statutes, particularly where the single
parents later objected to nonparents’ childcare petitions.127 Thus,
nonparents who hold out children as their own, typically with single
parents’ strong implicit—even if not explicit—consent, may later
seek second parent status in childcare settings over the objections of
the single parents.128 As shown earlier, statutory provisions do not
if they wish to do so . . . . The constitutional protections afforded parenthood therefore
obligate the courts to uphold voluntary visitation agreements made by fit parents, not
declare them invalid.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). See also Ingram v. Knippers, 72 P.3d 17, 21–22 (Okla. 2003)
(finding grandparent visitation decree pursuant to agreement in paternity action cannot be voided by
parent without a showing of a change in circumstances and that child’s best interest would be served by
modifying the agreement); Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 31 (Tenn. 2013) (“Once grandparents have
obtained court-ordered visitation, however, the presumption of superior parental rights does not apply in
proceedings to modify or terminate grandparent visitation. Declining to apply the presumption . . . not
only gives deference to a court’s order, but it also promotes the important policy goal of stability for the
child.’”) (quoting Rennels v. Rennels 257 P.3d 396, 401–02 (Nev. 2011)).
124. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Schlam, 648 N.E.2d 345, 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (estopping birth
mother from challenging former husband’s childcare standing twenty-seven months after a joint custody
order was entered). Cf. In re Marriage of Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d 799, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (allowing
parent to challenge former stepparent’s childcare standing where earlier child visitation agreement was
“gratuitous,” part of a “temporary order,” and where there was no detrimental reliance by former
stepparent).
125. See Parness, supra note 36, at 766–67.
126. See Brown v. Wyandt, No. 8-13-08, 2014 WL 222820, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2014).
127. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 310 (Ohio 2011) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
128. See Parness, supra note 36, at 757–58.
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always require the “agreement” of the recognized parent.129 Where
statutes do not demand agreement, courts often read statutes to deem
consent or comparable voluntary action crucial, or at least very
important.130 Similarly, common law cases have recognized that a
comparable holding out by a nonparent, coupled with single parent
acquiescence, can prompt the nonparent to become a newlydesignated second parent, or a nonparent with childcare standing,
over the single parent’s later objection.131 In all these instances, the
voluntary acts involve one parent’s allowing a nonparent to
coparent—not the one parent’s agreeing or acting as though the
nonparent may eventually be a parent.132
So, the nature of required parental consent or comparable
voluntary action is elusive. It of course includes the situation in
which a single parent voluntarily and knowingly gives informed
consent to diminish his or her own superior parental rights regarding
a certain child, thereby allowing another person to attain second
parent status by proving elements such as residency and parent-child
like bond or nonparty standing to seek childcare serving a child’s
best interests. But in most cases, both parents and nonparents will act
having no prior understanding of the legal nuances that guide
superior parental rights and their partial waivers. Thus, often without
making truly voluntary, knowing, and informed decisions as to what
may lie ahead, courts diminish superior parental rights of single
parents and grant second parent or nonparent childcare.133 In
addition, child support obligations are also assigned to newly
designated second parents or to nonparents with childcare standing,
impacting the due process property interests of those obligated,
without there ever having been, subjectively, a support order
foreseeable to the nonparent.134

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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Under Delaware law, de facto parenthood requires a single parent
and nonparent to make more informed decisions when evaluating
whether to grant the nonparent second parent status, determining
childcare opportunities, and negotiating child support obligations.135
Delaware law defines a de facto parent as one who exercised
“parental responsibility” and served in a “parental role” so that “a
bonded and dependent relationship” developed that is “parental in
nature,” where there was “the support and consent of the child’s
parent.”136 Here, both single parents and nonparents are likely more
aware of the possible consequences of their childcare acts. Yet, the
Delaware Code provision governing presumed parenthood requires
less informed decision making, as a “man is presumed the father of a
child if . . . [f]or the first 2 years of the child’s life, he resided in the
same household with the child and openly held out the child as his
own.”137 And Nevada law presumes a man to be a natural father of a
child if he and the child’s mother were cohabitating for at least six
months before conception and continued “to cohabit through the
period of conception.”138
By comparison, informed decision making requirements that guide
diminishments of superior parental rights vary when nonparents
acquire childcare standing through non-contractual parental
conduct.139 In Oregon, “any person . . . who has established
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing
personal relationship with a child may petition” for a childcare order;
in determining whether there is a rebuttal of the presumption “that
the legal parent acts in the best interest of the child,” the court “may
consider” whether the legal parent has “fostered, encouraged or
consented to the relationship.”140 In North Carolina, a nonparent can
135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2009).
136. Id. Section 203 clarifies that de facto parentage “applies for all purposes, except as otherwise
specifically provided by other law of this State.” Tit 13, § 8-203.
137. Tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5). Comparable state laws include N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-204(A)(5)
(2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-10(1)(e) (2009); and OKLA. STAT. tit. 10.7700 § 204 (2009).
138. NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.051(1)(b) (2010).
139. See Parness, supra note 36, at 776–77.
140. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1), (2)(a), (2)(b), 4(a)(C), 4(b)(D) (2013) (allowing presumption to be
overcome by preponderance of evidence when “a child-parent relationship exists” and holding “clear
and convincing evidence” is needed where “an ongoing personal relationship exists”).
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seek a child custody award if it would “promote the interest and
welfare of the child”141 and if the existing parent acted in a manner
inconsistent with his or her parental status, although such action need
not constitute bad acts.142 In New York, nonparent childcare standing
arises only after “a judicial finding of surrender, abandonment,
unfitness, persistent neglect, unfortunate or involuntary extended
disruption of custody, or other equivalent but rare extraordinary
circumstance which would drastically affect the welfare of the
child.”143 And in Indiana, only parents, stepparents, and grandparents
can seek visitation with a former minor ward over parental objection
by demonstrating with clear and convincing evidence that the parent
long acquiesced in the guardian’s custody or voluntarily relinquished
the child so that the affections of the child and guardian became so
close that to sever the relationship would severely harm the child.144
III. GUIDANCE ON CHILDCARE STANDING VIA PRENUPS AND
MIDNUPS
Children change everything when it comes to assessing prenups
and midnups. The Act recognizes that children change prenups and
midnups by distinguishing between property pacts and custodial
responsibility pacts.145 Similarly, Maine legislators have recognized
this concern by declaring that “an effective premarital agreement is
void 18 months after the parties to the agreement become biological
or adoptive parents or guardians of a minor,” unless they “sign a
written amendment” (which need not alter any terms).146 How should
public interests in child welfare, together with the interests of the
contracting parties and of any intended contract beneficiaries, be
balanced within special laws on prenup and midnup agreements that
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (2013).
142. Heatzig v. Maclean, 664 S.E.2d 347, 351 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
143. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283 (N.Y. 1976).
144. I.E. v. W.L., 997 N.E.2d 358, 364–65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Kitchen v. Kitchen, 953
N.E.2d 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), which employed the test from In re B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind.
2002)).
145. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 10, 9C U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 2014).
146. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 606 (2012).
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go beyond simply recognizing that “personal” matters may be
addressed, or that “guidance” may be provided on “custodial
responsibility”?
First, state legislators need to coordinate prenup and midnup laws
that address post-dissolution custodial opportunities with their
existing laws on nonbiological parents, nonadoptive parents, and
nonparents in childcare settings. Jurisdictions differ significantly on
parental presumptions, de facto parenthood, grandparent visitation,
former stepparent visitation, and other avenues to parent and
nonparent childcare opportunities for those with no actual biological
ties or no formal adoptive ties.147 Where existing laws already
provide some opportunities for childcare standing for new parents
and nonparents, any new statutes on prenups and midnups should
expressly recognize those laws.
Nonparents should be able to use prenups or midnups to better
secure later childcare opportunities by agreeing to act in ways that
conform to existing nonparent childcare laws. Single parents should
be able to outline directly in prenups or midnups support or
opposition to any later second parent or nonparent childcare standing
under existing laws where parental “agreement” is important. Such
pacts would guide courts that later examine childcare issues.
In addition, new prenup and midnup statutes should extend
existing statutory and precedential circumstances for new parent and
nonparent childcare standing. That is, prenups and midnups should
support second parent status or nonparent childcare standing that
would otherwise be unavailable, at least where existing laws are not
preemptive of further legal developments and are not undermined by
new developments.148

147. For differences in American parentage laws see, for example, Parness, supra note 36, at 755–56
& n.62. For differences in American grandparent visitation laws, see, for example, Jeff Atkinson, Shifts
in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 2 (2013). For differences in American stepparent visitation laws, see, for example, Jeffrey A.
Parness, Survey of Illinois Law: Stepparent Childcare, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 15–16 (2014).
148. For example, prenups and midnups on parentage arising from births to gestational carriers should
not be enforced where the laws expressly ban surrogacy pacts. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855
(2011).
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Although a prenup or a midnup should provide guidance, judges
should not always follow a prenup or a midnup on future childcare. A
child’s best interest remains paramount and is not limited by superior
parental rights. For example, a childcare prenup or midnup that
would endanger a child’s safety should not be enforced, regardless of
its validity at the time of its making or the current intentions of the
contracting parties.149
IV. GUIDANCE ON CHILD SUPPORT VIA PRENUPS AND MIDNUPS
Superior parental rights are generally not endangered by prenups
or midnups that promise future child support.150 Childcare parents,
their children, and the state all usually desire more, rather than less,
money for children. Enforcement of child support promises is so
strongly favored that sometimes there is no requirement that
consideration support such promises arising from or growing out of
supposed, presumed, or alleged parent-child relationships.151
Likewise, special contract requirements could render enforceable
prenup and midnup pacts on future parents and nonparents, even
where the pacts address future child support. Such pacts could also
encompass support promises by future and present stepparents, future
and present grandparents, and other family members.
Usually, a court-compelled child support assessment, according to
a prenup or midnup, should not depend on a recognition of childcare
standing152 and certainly need not accompany an award of childcare,
149. See, e.g., In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 463–64, 466 (Tex. 2013) (J. Green, dissenting) (opining
that the trial court has discretion not to enforce mediated settlement agreement on child custody where
enforcement is not in child’s best interest because the child’s safety would be endangered).
150. However, “[i]f unwritten consent to parent with the birth mother can prompt a second parent,
there are concerns not only about respecting the birth mother’s superior parental rights but also about
whether the second parent is unduly saddled with child support duties. See Parness, supra note 36, at
757–58.
151. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
152. Thus, child support duties often remain for parents whose childcare interests have been
involuntarily terminated. See, e.g., Ex Parte M.D.C., 39 So.3d 1117, 1133 (Ala. 2009) and In re Beck,
793 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Mich. 2010). See generally Jason M. Merrill, Falling Through the Cracks:
Distinguishing Parental Rights From Parental Obligations in Cases Involving Termination of the
Parent-Child Relationship, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 203 (2008). Voluntary terminations due to anticipated
adoptions frequently end such duties, however. See e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/17 (1999) (“After
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even for those with childcare standing.153 And one would assume that
child support orders, agreed to by contract, would not interfere with
childcare, and in fact, would be welcomed by parents, grandparents,
stepparents, and others who undertake childcare. Thus, generally
courts should enforce prenups of future spouses, future or current
grandparents, and others who undertake childcare for future child
support. In addition, courts should be keen to enforce current
stepparents, grandparents, and step-grandparents’ midnups that
provide for future child support.
Outside of prenups and midnups, courts already enforce child
support promises where there may not otherwise be a support
obligation. For instance, courts enforce intimate partner agreements,
including an unwed154 or wed155 partner’s future support.156 Courts
also require child support in the absence of express support promises,
even for parties no longer interested in—or eligible for—childcare

either the entry of an order terminating parental rights or the entry of a judgment of adoption, the natural
parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child and
shall be deprived of all legal rights as respects the child, and the child shall be free from all obligations
of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural parents.”). See also In re C.N., 839 N.W.2d 841,
845 (N.D. 2013) (using N.D. Code 14-09-08.21 to order child support for a father, whose parental rights
were terminated where there was no pending or anticipated adoption).
153. Thus, some state Dissolution of Marriage Acts and Parentage Acts expressly permit child
support awards against parents who do not then have custody, visitation, or comparable childcare orders.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 598.10(b) (2001) (“[T]o encourage compliance with a visitation order, a
temporary order for custody shall provide for a minimum visitation schedule with the noncustodial
parent, unless the court determines that such visitation is not in the best interest of the child” within
dissolution proceeding); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/14(a)(2) (1999) (“If a judgment of parentage contains
no explicit award of custody, the establishment of a support obligation or of visitation rights in one
parent shall be considered a judgment granting custody to the other parent” within Parentage Act
proceeding).
154. Compare In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003) (finding unwed, male partner
bound to support AHR child born to unwed, female partner via common law child support action
founded on earlier oral agreement, although it was outside the assisted reproduction statute because
there was no written consent and no marriage), with In re A.M.K., No. 2011 AP2660, 2013 WL
4746428, at *3 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2013) (noting woman’s promise to “share all expenses” of
child born to her same-sex partner, even if construed as a promise of child support on any breakup,
could not support a court order on support as the woman was a nonparent and there was no authorizing
statute).
155. See, e.g., Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 603–04 (Ind. 1994) (equitably estopping husband
from denying support duty where he consented to AHR with donor semen).
156. See, e.g., Tirey v. Tirey, 806 N.E.2d 360, 364–65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting man could not
later escape support duty by showing no biological ties).
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orders, as is the case with former stepparents, who acknowledged
parentage although they are biologically unrelated.157
When might courts properly deny enforcement of child support
promises within prenups and midnups? Courts should resist
enforcement when parents do not wish to pursue or to have
pursued—as by the state seeking welfare payment reimbursement—
available child support because enforcement would not serve their
children’s best interests or would unduly interfere with their superior
rights, including decision making about their child’s care, custody, or
control.158 Courts should also reluctantly enforce such agreements
when nonparents’ child support promises were undertaken for
improper purposes, such as buying parental acquiescence in future
childcare standing (e.g., future recognitions of nonparents as parents,
or of nonparents as third parties (like grandparents), with childcare
standing) where childcare standing would otherwise not arise.159
Childcare standing should not be able to be bought and sold.160

157. See, e.g., DeBoer v. DeBoer, 822 N.W.2d 730, 735 (S.D. 2012) (employing Texas law to find
support could be assessed against a former nonbiological stepfather who helped initiate a new birth
certificate to change his wife’s child’s last name to his last name).
158. See, e.g., In re Starla D. v. Jeremy E., 945 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (holding
mother’s child support action against biological father could proceed because it posed no detriment to
child’s interests).
159. A prenup recognizing a future stepparent’s future child support obligations in the event of
dissolution, as well as the possibility that the future stepparent might qualify as a de facto parent
sometime after marriage, differs from a prenup that recognizes a future stepparent’s future child support
obligations, as well as automatic de facto parenthood in the event of dissolution (in that the single parent
will not resist, and perhaps conspire to aid in a parentage finding). Childcare standing should not be able
to be bought regardless of later circumstances, even if the child would welcome the child support.
Perhaps with the latter prenup, a child support promise, should be enforced, even if a promise of
automatic de facto parenthood would not be enforced.
160. Special contract requirements on promises not to pursue future child support demand different
analyses. Parents usually may not bargain away the support opportunities for the children in their care.
For example, in marriage dissolution proceedings, one parent cannot promise not to pursue child support
in return for the other parent’s promise not to seek a childcare order. See, e.g., Tilley v. Tilley, 947
S.W.2d 63, 65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (“Thus, the statute makes it clear that while the parties are free to
enter into a separation agreement to promote settlement of the divorce, the court still retains control over
child custody, support, and visitation and is not bound by the parties’ agreement in those areas.”).
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V. GUIDANCE ON CHILD CREATION VIA PRENUPS AND MIDNUPS
American state statutes regulate child creation pacts that involve
assisted reproduction outside of any statutes or cases on prenups or
midnups.161 Assisted reproduction statutes are, at times, incomplete
as to all who might contract, such as when they only address married,
heterosexual couples.162
Where there are no child creation statutes involving assisted
reproduction, some state court judges have developed common law
principles that look for guidance within child creation contracts.163
Other state court judges have decided not to develop common law,
calling instead for legislative action.164
Statutes and case law on prenups and midnups could sanction only
child creation pacts, based on the rationale that they are already
recognized outside of contemplated or existing marriage or marriagelike settings. But prenups and midnups could also specially speak to
161. For differing approaches to surrogacy pacts, see supra note 112 and In re Paternity of F.T.R.,
2013 WI 66, ¶¶ 93–95, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 129–30, 833 N.W.2d 634, 653 (Wis. 2013) (outlining both
domestic and international approaches). For differing approaches to AHR pacts see supra note 112.
162. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2.5 (1999) (surrogates used by intended married parents) and
tit. 40/3(a) (1999) (discussing artificial insemination employed by married, opposite-sex couple). But
see Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 39–40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (denying equal protection to
same-sex, domestic partner couples when statutes only address parentage of husband whose wife bears a
child through artificial insemination).
163. See, e.g., Chambers v. Chambers, No. CN00–09493, 2002 WL 1940145, at *4, *10 (Del. Fam.
Ct. Feb. 5, 2002) (finding that while lesbian partner was not an egg donor, she was still a legal parent);
D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 328 (Fla. 2013) (finding egg donor is a parent because the statute,
which requires an egg donor to relinquish parental rights, is unconstitutional); Szafranski v. Dunston,
993 N.E.2d 502, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (finding dispute over pre-embryos between ex-boyfriend and
ex-girlfriend resolved by their intentions in prior agreements); St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3d 1027, 1036
(Nev. 2013) (finding District Court could enforce contract, which spoke to surrogacy pacts for married
couple, between unwed, lesbian couple whereby one partner carried child, the other donated the egg,
and each would coparent, outside parameters of parentage statute); Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 39–40
(finding statute that recognizes AHR use only by married, opposite-sex couples violates equal
protections afforded same-sex, female couples who consent to AHR).
164. See, e.g., Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 14–15 (Del. 2009) (noting de facto parentage must be
undertaken by General Assembly); In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(noting the legislature, not the court, should decide whether parentage vests at birth in a wife whose
husband’s sperm led to the birth of a child with a surrogate per assisted reproduction). See also, K.M. v.
E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 690 (Cal. 2005) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s finding
that both lesbian partners were parents of twins born to one partner through assisted reproduction with
ova of other partner, and stating, “[o]nly legislation defining parentage in the context of assisted
reproduction is likely to restore predictability and prevent further lapses into the disorder of ad hoc
adjudication.”).
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marriage-related pacts that extend contractual opportunities. Special
prenup and midnup child creation laws would then guide courts in
determining future parentage, childcare, and support, unless the
prenup or midnups were unconscionable,165 contrary to state public
policy,166 or were per se or otherwise unenforceable.
Child creation prenups and midnups could also contain choice of
law provisions,167 provide written consent,168 and specify witness,169
lawyer,170 and doctor171 participation.
165. Process requirements already attend prenups and midnups dealing with property matters. Such
requirements would also operate for child creation prenups and midnups. But additional requirements
for child creation pacts may arise from other sources, such as the requirements of assisted reproduction
statutes. See, e.g., 40/3(a).
166. For example, in the absence of statutes, some courts have held surrogacy pacts substantively
unenforceable in their states. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988); R.R. v. M.H.,
689 N.E.2d 790, 793, 795 (Mass. 1998). Some state statutes explicitly prohibit surrogacy pacts. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-218(A) (2007), invalidated by Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994); D.C. CODE § 16-402(a) (2013); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2008) (declaring it against
public policy to enforce certain terms of a surrogacy agreement); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2013)
(“A surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”).
Substantive unenforceability could be limited to certain surrogacy or other AHR pacts where
distinctions are drawn between classes of contracting parties. Thus, a prenup child creation pact
involving a man, his future or current spouse, and another woman who is to be a surrogate could be per
se unenforceable when neither the man nor the woman is to provide genetic material. See, e.g., In re
Paternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596, 600–01 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding petition to disestablish
maternity contrary to public policy where child would be declared motherless). A prenup between a
man, his future or current female spouse, and another man that addresses child creation and provides
that a man and woman would have sexual intercourse to bear a child that will be reared exclusively by
the man and his spouse or spouse-to-be might be per se unenforceable; the Lehr paternity opportunity
interests in a man’s future child may be deemed not waivable preconception. But see In re A.R.L., 318
P.3d 581, 583–84, 588–89 (Colo. App. 2013) (finding that a biological mother’s former, same-sex
partner can seek parental status under the state’s Uniform Parentage Act, where the mother and her
friend had sex prompting birth, even though former partner did not know of—or agree to—have sex,
although she agreed to the mother’s artificial insemination, at least where the friend consistently pursued
an “admission of nonpaternity”).
167. Courts occasionally confront choice of law issues involving child creation, such as when a
domestic couple arranges for a surrogate in a foreign state, particularly when two domestic laws
conflict, or when domestic laws conflict with international or foreign laws. See generally Martin Engel,
Cross-Border Surrogacy: Time for a Convention?, FAMILY LAW AND CULTURE IN EUROPE:
DEVELOPMENTS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES; PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH CONFERENCE OF THE
COMMISSION
ON
EUROPEAN
FAMILY
LAW
(forthcoming
2014),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2348270.
168. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2009), with § 9-10-201(b) (“Any child born to a
married woman by means of artificial insemination shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of the
woman and the woman’s husband if the husband consents in writing to the artificial insemination.”
Otherwise, he is a “presumed” parent, “except in the case of a surrogate mother”). See also FLA. STAT.
§ 742.11(1) (2009) (stating except with gestational surrogacy, a child born within wedlock via artificial
or in vitro insemination “is irrebuttably presumed” the child of the husband, if he and his wife have
“consented in writing”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2010) (“Any child born to a married woman as
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Child creation prenups and midnups could address matters like ova
and sperm sources, surrogate choice, the dispositions of frozen
embryos on dissolution of the intimate relationship of the contracting
parties, sources of financial support, and child creation timing. Where
the child creation contracts themselves are not invalid, even where
certain contractual terms or contract formation processes are
problematic,172 the legal effects attending child creation should be
significantly guided by fairly formulated prenups or midnups.
Included within these legal effects are both parentage designations,
such as where the contractors’ intentions regarding future parental
status are often followed,173 and childcare opportunities, for example
where the contractors’ intentions as to future nonparent (nonparent
gestational carrier or grandparent) visitation or support are
followed.174
CONCLUSION
States are increasingly recognizing childcare opportunities and
child support obligations for newly recognized parents and for
nonparents, and there has been a rapid increase in child creation pacts
a result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband, shall be considered the legitimate
child of the mother and such husband.”).
169. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(b)(5) (West 2014) (requiring that a “gestational surrogacy
contract . . . be witnessed by 2 competent adults.”).
170. 47/35 (requiring “attorneys’ certifications” to establish a parent-child relationship before birth
through a gestational surrogacy pact, where different attorneys represent the gestational surrogate and
the intended parent or parents).
171. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-202(a) (2009) (“Artificial insemination of a woman shall only be
performed under the supervision of a physician licensed under the Arkansas Medical Practices Act”).
172. For problematic contracts involving embryo disposition, see, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, Embryo
Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 378, 442–43 (stating contracts should be “in writing, drafted by or in consultation with an attorney
representing the parties (not the physician), and executed with due time to consider the ramifications of
the decision . . . .”).
173. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ohio 2007) (“[A] gestational surrogate, whose
pregnancy does not involve her own egg, may have a different legal position from a traditional
surrogate, whose pregnancy does involve her own egg.”).
174. For example, courts might enforce child creation pacts that confer childcare opportunities on a
child’s maternal grandparents, particularly where the grandparents’ daughter’s genetic material and
pregnancy led to birth, but whose death during childbirth left the child with a single parent (who thus
gave up, in advance, that single parent’s opportunity to oppose any possible maternal grandparent
childcare by invoking the superior rights doctrine).
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involving assisted human reproduction. In this context, agreements
on—or acquiescence in—childrearing, child support, and child
creation are highly relevant when determining which parents and
nonparents have childcare standing and child support obligations.
After 2012, the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act
recognized that prenups and midnups could directly address
“custodial responsibility.”175 If states adopt the Act, states should
include childcare, child support, and child creation promises within
the ambit of “custodial responsibility.” Prenups and midnups that
contain such promises should guide courts in determining what
happens to children of couples whose state-recognized relationships
have been dissolved.176

175. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 10, U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 2014).
176. Id.
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